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Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9567

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5300

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, RH
SUBJ: EEC BRIEFING: KISSINGER MISSION TO RHODESIA

UK DELEGATION PROVIDED US ON SEPT 29 WITH AN ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE BRIEFING ON RHODISA GIVEN TO THE EEC AMBASSADORS IN LONDON ON SEPT 28 BY THE HEAD OF THE RHODESIA DEPARTMENT OF THE FCO. UK DEL NOTED THAT IT HAD RECIEVED THIS BRIEFING AFTER THE PERMREP LUNCHEON OF YESTERDAY SO THAT SIR JOHN KILLICK WAS UNABLE TO DRAW ON IT DURING LUNCHEON DISCUSSIONS ON RHODESIA. TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:
I. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THEIR FORBEARANCE IN NOT PRESSING US FOR INFORMATION ON US/UK. CONSULTATIONS LEADING UP TO, AND DURING, THE KISSINGER MISSION TO AFRICA. THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY HAD BEEN OF PRIME IMPORTANCE. ANY PREMATURE LEAK MIGHT HAVE ENABLED SMITH TO UNDERMINE THE PRESSURES ON HIM TO ACCEPT EARLY MAJORITY RULE.

II. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY SMITH IN HIS STATEMENT OF 24 SEPT HAD BEEN CONCEIVED BY US AND WERE FORESHADOWED IN MR. CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT OF 22 MARCH. BUT DR. KISSINGER HAD BEEN THE MIDWIFE. HIS INTERVENTION HAD
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BEEN DECISIVE.

III. ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF MR. ENNALS' VISIT TO EAST AFRICA IN LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL HAD BEEN TO SEEK A BROAD

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ENDORSEMENT OF THE PACKAGE FROM THE QUOTE FRONT-LINE UNQUOTE
AFRICAN PRESIDENTS, AND THROUGH THEM, FROM THE AFRICAN
NATIONALIST LEADERS.

IV. WE HAD HOPED THAT THE NATIONALIST LEADERS MIGHT BE
PREPARED TO SHELVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND AGREE UPON A COMMON
PROGRAMME OF ACTION. ONCE OUR PROPOSALS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY
THE AFRICAN SIDE WE HAD HOPED TO MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES
ON THE ILLEGAL REGIME TO ACCEPT THEM. BUT PRESIDENT NYERERE
HAD ASKED US TO HOLD OUR HAND UNTIL THE PRESIDENTS HAD MADE
A FURTHER EFFORT TO REUNITE THE RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS.

V. FOLLOWING HIS SPEECH IN LUSAKA ON 27 APRIL, ENDORSING MR.
CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT OF 22 MARCH, DR. KISSINGER HAD HAD HIS
FIRST MEETING IN ZURICH WITH MR. VORSTER. HE HAD REPORTED TO US
THAT MR. VORSTER WOULD BE WILLING, IF THE AMERICANS COULD COME UP
WITH SUITABLE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO GET
THEM ACCEPTED BY SMITH.

VI. DR. KISSINGER HAD ASKED US TO PRODUCE A PLAN. THIS WE
HAD DONE: IT WAS PASSED BY THE AMERICANS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN
AUTHORITIES BEFORE DR. KISSINGER'S SECOND MEETING WITH VORSTER
IN ZURICH IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. AS A RESULT OF THAT MEETING, DR.
KISSINGER HAD BEEN SATISFIED THAT MR. VORSTER WOULD PLAY HIS
PART IN GETTING THE PROPOSAL ACCEPTED. DR. KISSINGER THEN
SET OFF ON HIS MISSION TO AFRICA.

VII. WHY HAD SMITH CAPITULATED? THE REGIME HAD LONG BEEN
AWARE THAT RHODESIA WAS FIGHTING A QUOTE NO WIN UNQUOTE WAR.
THEY WERE FACED WITH THE PROSPECT OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF
GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, PUTTING INTOLERABLE STRAINS ON THEIR D
RESERVES OF MANPOWER. ALSO, THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE WAS RUNNING
OUT FAST AND (AS SHOWN BY THE WHITE EMIGRATION FIGURES)
WHITE MORALE WAS EBBING RAPIDLY. BUT THE DECISIVE FACTOR WAS
KISSINGER'S INTERVENTION AND THE FACT THAT HE AND MR. VORSTER
HAD MADE IT PLAIN TO SMITH THAT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES
NOR SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO HIS RESCUE.
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VIII. THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY SMITH HAD BEEN EXPLAINED BY
DR. KISSINGER TO PRESIDENTS NYERERE AND KAUNDA BUT THERE
HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OVER THEIR STATUS. MR. SMITH (AND
MR. VORSTER) CLEARLY REGARDED THEM AS CONSTITUTING FIXED ELEMENTS
OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, WHILE THE PRESIDENTS SEEMED TO HAVE
BEEN EXPECTING THEM TO EMERGE AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

IX. THE TONE OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMUNIQUE, FOLLOWING THE
SUMMIT AT LUSAKA, WAS HARSH. BUT, IN SUBSTANCE, WE DID NOT
REGARD IT AS A REJECTION OF THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY SMITH.
THE PRESIDENTS SEEMED TO HAVE TWO CHIEF CONCERNS: THAT THE FORM
AND STRUCTURE OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE LEFT FOR NE-
GOATION, AND THAT SMITH SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE

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COURSE OF THAT NEGOTIATION. BUT WE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE
PRESIDENTS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FIRST ESSENTIAL WAS TO
INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON AN INTERIM
GOVERNMENT AND WERE CONTENT TO LEAVE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INDEPENDENCE
CONSTITUTION TO A LATER STAGE.

X. H M G HAD AGREED TO HELP ORGANISE SUCH A NEGOTIATION.
MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT ON 26 SEPT TO FOUR OF THE PRESIDENTS
EXPLAINING THAT MR. ROWLANDS WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS WITH THEM
WHERE, AND WHEN, THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE, AND WHO SHOULD
TAKE PART.

XI. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER SMITH AND HIS COLLEAGUES
WOULD STILL AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMATION
OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT . HE MIGHT FEEL THAT HE HAD BEEN PERSUADED
TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO EARLY MAJORITY RULE UNDER THE MISUNDERSTANDING
THAT THE PRESIDENTS HAD ACCEPTED IN TOTO (LAST TWO WORDS UNDER-
LINED) THE PROPOSALS PUT TO HIM BY DR. KISSINGER. NEVERTHELESS,
HIS PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO EARLY MAJORITY RULE HAD CREATED A NEW
SITUATION. WE WERE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT A WHITE RHODESIAN
TEAM WOULD AGREE TO TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5300

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XII. THE PRESIDENTS HAD STILL TO QUOTE DELIVER UNQUOTE A
ZIMBABWE NEGOTIATING TEAM. AT THEIR SUMMIT MEETING IN DAR EARLIER
THIS MONTH, THEY APPEARED TO HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ENCOURAGING
THOSE POLITICAL LEADERS WHO ENJOYED BACKING AMONG THE GUERRILLAS
TO AGREE TO FORM A WORKING COALITION. NKOMO, THE UNDISPUTED
LEADER OF ZAPU, HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO ESTABLISH LINKS WITH THE ZANU
GUERRILLAS AND WITH MUGABE, WHO HAD EMERGED AS THEIR SPOKESMAN.

XIII. IF NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WERE SUCCESSFUL,
BRITAIN WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO QUOTE LEGALISE UNQUOTE
THAT GOVERNMENT. BUT IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION TO ASSUME
RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM

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PERIOD.

XIV. THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS ENVISAGED THAT, UPON THE FORMATION
OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE LIFTED.
IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE ABSURD TO MAINTAIN THEM WHEN THEIR RAISON
DE'ETRE (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) HAD DISAPPEARED. IT WOULD BE
APPROPRIATE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE AT NEW YORK TO DISCUSS
MODALITIES OF ACTION AT THE UN WHEN THE TIME CAME. MEANWHILE
WE WOULD URGE THEM TO CONTINUE TO APPLY SANCTIONS FULLY.
IF SANCTIONS WERE NO LONGER TO BE FULLY APPLIED, IT COULD ENCOURAGE
SMITH TO RENEGE.

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS (REMARKABLY FEW) THE FOLLOWING POINTS
WERE MADE:
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A. IN HIS STATEMENT OF 24 SEPT, SMITH HAD FAITHFULLY
REPRODUCED, WITH MINOR ALTERATIONS, THE PROPOSALS PUT TO HIM
BY KISSINGER. BUT HE HAD PUT HIS OWN INTERPRETATION ON THOSE
PROPOSALS, IN PARTICULAR, HE HAD CLAIMED THAT THE COUNCIL
OF STATE WOULD HAVE QUOTE SUPREME POWER UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NOT
A NECESSARY INFERENCE FROM THE LANGUAGE KISSINGER HAD USED.
WE BELIEVED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND
THE DIVISION OF POWER BETWEEN ITS ORGANS WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT
TO NEGOTIATION.

B. H M G WOULD NOT WISH TO BE RESPONSIBILE FOR GOVERNMENT
IN RHODESIA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. BUT WE ENVISAGED THE
APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE IN
SALISBURY, WHO WOULD HAVE A QUASI-DIPLOMATIC FUNCTION AND BE AT
HAND TO HELP FURTHER THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE INDEPENDENCE
CONSTITUTION.

C. H M G WOULD OBSERVE THE DUE PROCEDURES AT THE UN ON THE
LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, BUT WAYS SHOULD BE EXPLORED OF AVOIDING
THE RISK OF A RUSSIAN VETO. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO PROMOTE

A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION RECOGNISING THAT THE FORMATION
OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT REMOVED THE PREVIOUS THREAT TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

D. THE BRITISH/US GOVERNMENTS HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISED OR

DISMAYED BY THE REACTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTS. THE PRESIDENTS HAD
MADE IT PLAIN THAT THEY WELCOMED THE RESULTS OF THE
KISSINGER MISSION, ALTHOUGH THEY RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON
THE FORM AND POWERS OF THE ORGANS OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IN
OUR VIEW, THE FIRST ESSENTIAL WAS TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES
CONCERNED TO EMBARK ON NEGOTIATIONS.
END TEXT

2. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AS APPROPRIATE.STRAUSZ-HUPE

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